[WestMALocals] Fwd: GDI Proposal #1 Before StateCom| Co-Sponsors Sought

[Owen Broadhurst]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Owen Broadhurst <owen.broadhurst at gmail.com>
Date: Sep 28, 2005 3:34 PM
Subject: Re: GDI Proposal #1 Before StateCom| Co-Sponsors Sought
To: State Committee Official Business <statecom at green-rainbow.org>

  *http://tinyurl.com/7ft3o*
>
  The text for this initiative is as follows:
 *Affirming the Green Party's Independence from the Two Corporate Parties
*Tuesday September 27, @02:55PM, by Owen R. Broadhurst
*Subject :* Raison D'Etre
*Summary :*
One of the primary political differences within the Green Party of the
United States is over the nature of our relationship with the Democratic
Party and Republican Party. Some Greens favor electoral alliances with
progressive Democrats and election campaigns that will avoid "spoiling" the
chances of electing a Democratic candidate. Other Greens are opposed to the
Green Party of the United States ever supporting, directly or indirectly,
any Democrat or Republican candidate for office, arguing that "lesser evil"
campaigns lend legitimacy to corporate parties, weaken the Green Party, and
delay the implementation of true electoral reform, among other negative
effects.

What This Resolution Says

This resolution places our state party on record as opposing any party-level
concession to, or alliance with, the two corporate parties. This is a
rejection of Green Party endorsement of any Democrat or Republican, and a
rejection of indirect support for one corporate party candidate over
another. The Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, or the
leadership, of the Green Party of the United States shall not embrace a
"safe states" campaign.

Why This Resolution Is Needed

In the recent history of progressive third parties, there are many examples
of parties that tried to grow without challenging the corporate parties,
especially the Democratic Party. For example, the New Party tried to grow
through fusion candidates. Fusion is the practice of one party placing
another party's candidate on its ballot line. The 1990's incarnation of the
US Labor Party would not challenge Democratic Party candidates at all.
Needless to say, all of these efforts have failed. The most successful third
party attempt in recent history has been the Green Party of the United
States, which has consistently grown whenever it has challenged the
corporate duopoly. Unfortunately many people in the leadership of the Green
Party of the United States continue to believe that Greens must now and then
support Democrats as the "lesser of two evils."

*Text :*
The Green-Rainbow Party affirms that we consider the Democratic Party and
Republican Party to be at the service of corporate interests, regardless of
any particular candidate that they nominate in a given year.

We, as a state party, will not endorse, place on our ballot lines, urge a
vote for, raise funds for, or otherwise support any candidate from the
corporate parties. In this instance "support" is also interpreted to mean
selective opposition to a candidate's opponent.

We also urge the Green Party of the United States and its national
candidates to commit to the strategy described above for all national
elections, and to adopt a policy that denies the support of any Green Party
of the United States committee to any candidate or campaign that violates
the principle of independence from the two corporate parties.

We also urge our city, county, campus, and other local affiliates to adopt a
similar policy.

This resolution does not in any way restrict the Green-Rainbow Party or its
members from working with individuals from the corporate parties on issues
that we support, including non-violence, social justice, electoral reform,
or environmental sustainability.

Furthermore, this resolution does not restrict individual Greens or groups
of Greens from working for, raising funds for, or otherwise supporting any
candidate, as long as these activities are not done in the name of the
Green-Rainbow Party.

==============
 Gary Hicks has authored a comment expressing reservations:
 *Re: Affirming the Green Party's Independence from the Two Corporate
Parties*
Wednesday September 28, @11:57AM, by gary hicks
at a time when we need to be building the broadest unity possible "the
mother of all movements" --- we can ill afford to cherry-pick amongst lefts
and progressives as to who will be our friends. this proposal paints us into
a political corner. below: an article that reflects my views on direction.

in struggle,

gary hicks
===========================================================

The case for a neo-Rainbow electoral strategy

By Danny Glover & Bill Fletcher, Jr.

In the midst of the 2004 election year, progressives across the USA are
bemoaning the fact that while it is critical to un-elect President Bush,
there is very little that is exciting about the John Kerry campaign. Not
only this, but it is also the case that few answers are evident as to how
any of this can help progressives develop a real political/electoral base
that moves us any closer to building power and influence.

It is, therefore, within this context that a new or revised approach to
electoral politics must be considered. An approach that derives to a great
extent from the Rainbow insurgency of the 1980s, including the 1984 and 1988
Presidential campaigns of the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, as well as the initial
building of the National Rainbow Coalition[1]. The approach that Jackson
advanced—building an organization and campaign both inside and outside the
Democratic Party—points progressives in the direction we should be
advancing. In suggesting this approach, we do so recognizing the failure of
the Rainbow movement of the 1980s to live up to its potential.

Setting the stage

In a fateful gathering of the Executive Board of the National Rainbow
Coalition in Chicago during March of 1989, the Rev. Jesse Jackson sealed the
fate of the movement that had emerged from his two presidential campaigns.
In a move that shocked and outraged many of his most loyal supporters, Rev.
Jackson turned the National Rainbow Coalition—the core of his movement—into
a personal political operation. All hope of a nation-wide mass, democratic
progressive political/electoral formation faded almost immediately. Most
local Rainbow Coalitions, with a few notable exceptions, such as Vermont,
Alabama (which had already become the "Alabama New South Coalition") and New
Jersey, devolved into oblivion. Irrespective of Rev. Jackson's continued
progressive rhetoric, the political strategy that he had originally advanced
was abandoned. Many of the most dedicated Rainbow activists turned their
backs on Rev. Jackson, and in some cases electoral politics altogether.

In the wake of Rev. Jackson's coup against himself, so to speak, and the
implosion of Rainbow politics, alternative views and strategies relative to
progressive electoral and mass initiatives began to surface. These included:


The former agricultural commissioner from Texas, Jim Hightower, advanced a
proposal for a "Democratic-Populist Alliance" to fill the void left by the
collapse of the Jackson Rainbow.
The late, long-time fiery trade union leader Tony Mazzocchi, one time
Secretary-Treasurer of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW) pressed
forward with the notion of the need for a Labor Party. Galvanizing thousands
of trade union activists, the Labor Party was formed in the late 1990s.
Suggesting a unique and provocative approach to electoral politics, Dan
Cantor and Joel Rogers advanced a proposal for a fusion approach to
politics—later undermined by a Supreme Court decision in 1997—whereby
independent parties could achieve a separate voting line while votes for
said party could also be used to support parties endorsed by the smaller
independent party.
Former National Rainbow Coalition Executive Director Ron Daniels decided to
make a run as an independent for the presidency in 1992, attempting to base
himself largely among dissatisfied African-American voters.
The populist Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN)
during the 1980s and early 1990s flirted with establishing their own
political presence, reminding activists of the history of the Midwest
Non-Partisan Leagues of the early 20th century.
The Green Party emerged on the local level often successfully running for
municipal and county positions on a progressive platform.
While it is the case that these and other efforts, to varying degrees,
contributed to advancing discussions concerning independent progressive
political action, and some efforts more than others gained degrees of
momentum, an honest appraisal would probably conclude that the balance sheet
has not been favorable. This is true irrespective of intent, commitment and
vision. Something has seemed to have been missing. The easiest answer, of
course, is that there has not been someone of the stature of Rev. Jackson to
lead such a new political movement, but such an analysis is superficial at
best. It also misses the fact that we can do something now to introduce a
new political practice.

First, a word concerning lessons from the Rainbow

The Rainbow Coalition movement and the Jackson '84 and '88 presidential
campaigns were about far more than Jesse Jackson. One may need to be
reminded that prior to 1983 there was a degree of growing distrust in Rev.
Jackson, in part because of his propensity to jump from issue to issue,
raising a flag, and then disappearing to surface on yet another front. Yet,
in 1983, almost out of nowhere arose the call for "Run, Jesse, Run," in
cities across the USA[2].

The emergence of Jackson took place within the context of a larger Black-led
electoral upsurge which witnessed campaigns such as the successful Harold
Washington run for Mayor of Chicago to the unsuccessful, but no less
inspiring Mel King campaign for Mayor of Boston. These campaigns were both a
reaction to the early years of the Reagan/Bush administration and its
economic attacks on working people and veiled attacks on people of color, as
well as being focused around the notion of Black political power in light of
the weaknesses of the Civil Rights victories from two decades earlier.

Rev. Jackson seized the moment to speak nationally on behalf of these
movements, but he did something even more important than that. He had the
vision to articulate a set of politics that while based within the African
American experience, did not represent solely a "Black candidacy" or "Black
politics." In this sense, his effort went way beyond that suggested by
groups such as the National Black Independent Political Party, formed in
1980, to open up a new sphere for Black political intervention.

Instead, Jackson tapped into a growing anger and frustration arising on the
US political scene among groups of historically and newly disenfranchised
sectors. He spoke to issues of economic injustice while not abandoning the
question of race. As such, he did not fall prey to the classic error of
white populists who attempt to build unity by only addressing economic
issues. Jackson linked these issues. His appearances before white farmers
and workers brought forth a response that hitherto had been unpredictable.

Jackson also tapped into three other key constituencies: the African
American political establishment, the African American Church and the Left
(anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist forces). Jackson, to put it in its
bluntest sense, was not a threat to the political base or organization of
established Black politicians. By seeking to operate at the national level,
and specifically at the level of the presidency, he was not infringing on
the sphere of other elected officials. Thus, established politicians could
choose to hitch their wagons to Jackson, or remain separate, depending on
their specific objectives. The role of the Black political establishment
became problematic, particularly as the politics of election year 1988
unfolded. In fact, elements within them became the sirens singing their
sweet song attracting seafarers—in this case Rev. Jackson—to deadly rocks.

The Left, on the other hand, became a key force both within the '84
campaign, but especially in its aftermath with the construction of the
National Rainbow Coalition and the lead up to and actuality of the 1988
Presidential run. Sections of the organized Left, ranging from semi-Maoists
through social democrats, as well as countless independent leftists involved
themselves in the building of the Rainbow and the respective campaigns. In
many cases, key positions in both the Rainbow and the campaigns were
occupied by individuals who were of the Left (in some cases very openly; in
other cases in a more closed capacity). Mike Davis in his famous Prisoners
of the American Dream ends the book with a pointed critique of the failure
of sections of the Left to understand the importance of the '84 Jackson
campaign. By '88 there was far more involvement by the Left, as individuals
and organizations sensed that there was something deeply significant and
different about what was unfolding.

Rev. Jackson was additionally able to tap into networks within the Black
Church. These networks became major sources for campaign leadership and
mobilization across the USA. In the 1984 campaign he was additionally able
to tap into the Nation of Islam which, breaking with tradition, became
integrally involved in the campaign in its earlier stages.

What was sensed by sections of the Left, as well as other social forces, was
that the Rainbow Coalition and Jackson presidential candidacies suggested a
means for progressive forces to involve themselves in real world politics
that were connected to a fight for power. No one expected Jackson to receive
the Democratic Party nomination, let alone win the presidency, but the power
of the movement and the potential for something longer lasting signaled the
importance of this initiative.

As obvious as it may seem, it is worth adding that the significance of this
movement was also to be found in it emerging explicitly out of the African
American people's movement. Thus, this effort was not one with which many of
us have become familiar, i.e., a liberal or progressive white candidate
stepping forward with people of color being add-ons. The campaign was
Black-led, but was remarkably inclusive of non-Blacks. And, as noted
earlier, it was not a traditional protest candidacy, nor a candidacy engaged
solely in symbolic politics. The entire Rainbow movement, including the '84
and '88 campaigns, had very specific political objectives. These objectives
were not always consistent, it should be noted. Within the Rainbow movement
and the candidacies existed different agendas; sometimes overlapping, other
times clashing. In either case, these were agendas that went far beyond
simply shouting against racism and exclusion.

A final point. The Rainbow movement and candidacies had both the strength
and the weakness of possessing a charismatic leader. Rev. Jackson is an
outstanding leader and speaker, and succeeded in capturing the imagination
of millions of people. Swift, humorous, outspoken, and a master at timing,
Rev. Jackson served as the maximum leader for the movement. In doing so,
however, he did not consistently practice the approach taken toward
leadership by his mentor, the Rev. Martin Luther King. King felt comfortable
surrounding himself with very intelligent, independent-minded individuals.
He did not feel threatened by this. Jackson, on the other hand, proved
insecure when he was not in the limelight. Many of his most loyal and
hard-working supporters found themselves excluded from decision-making if
they somehow seemed to out-shine Jackson himself. Loyalty, in the Rainbow
movement, came to be based on personal loyalty to Jackson himself, rather
than loyalty to the movement and its objectives. Understanding this makes it
clearer how the March 1989 Rainbow Executive Board compliance with Jackson's
wishes for a personalist political operation came to pass. Objecting to Rev.
Jackson's proposals, in other words, was interpreted as an act of disloyalty
to Rev. Jackson-the-person. For many people, including significant leaders
in the Rainbow movement, silence rather than open disagreement with Rev.
Jackson was seen as the better course of action.

The failure of post-Rainbow electoral initiatives

Time and space do not permit an exhaustive examination of the failure of
each post-Rainbow electoral initiative. The failures had certain things in
common, but largely failed on their own terms.

Among the problems shared in common, however, the conjuncture has been an
important fact, i.e., understanding the political moment. The Jackson
campaigns emerged under specific conditions, including the Reagan/Bush era,
the demise of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, and, as noted
earlier and most especially, the Black-led electoral upsurge. Such
conditions provided a popular energy reserve that cannot be invented out of
thin air. While this does not mean that a Jackson-like movement cannot
reemerge, it does mean that understanding the moment is always key in
politics and that movements cannot simply be replicated, irrespective of the
lessons drawn.

The importance of race and the political movements of people of color is an
additional issue which is often overlooked. Certainly Ron Daniels' campaign
understood race, but it failed to galvanize much of a mass response for
other reasons. Most other efforts, however, have failed to appreciate the
centrality of race as a central factor in the US political scene. Race is
not simply an add-on any more than people of color should be. Race largely
defines US capitalism and has since its founding. Thus, attempts to address
US politics, issues of economic injustice, etc., in the absence of
understanding race, inevitably fail. Certainly the collapse of the Populist
movement at the tail end of the 19th century should be an example for all
those interested in the future of progressive electoral politics. Yet,
despite this historical rhetoric, white liberals, white progressives and all
too many white leftists fail to grasp this lesson, evidenced in the practice
of most union organizing, community organizing as well as various populist
political efforts.

Related to race is the issue of a base among communities of color. The
Rainbow movement not only addressed race as a programmatic and thematic
point, but having a base among African Americans, this movement gained a
certain moral authority to challenge the collective injustice of US society.
Other sectors rallied to this movement in large part because it was so
rooted. This was not a movement of the margins, but rather a movement of the
dispossessed. The difference is decisive.

Most of the post-Rainbow efforts have failed to grasp the importance of a
united front approach to politics. Jackson found a place within his tent for
various political forces. As mentioned earlier, the Left, the Black Church
as well as Black political establishment could be found within the Rainbow
movement. This was not, it should be noted, a relationship of comparable
power between these three sectors. The Black political establishment and the
Black Church were always in a stronger position vis a vis the Left, but
Jackson made overtures to include disparate forces, not allowing the
movement to be defined by one specific tendency. His approach, while not as
inclusive as Boston's Mel King (the person who actually rehabilitated the
term "Rainbow Coalition" after its disuse for more than a decade),
nevertheless included active outreach to and involvement of Asians, Latinos,
Native Americans, the women's movement, organized labor and the
environmental movement. The outreach sought leaders from within those
movements with which Jackson could ally.

The failures of most post-Rainbow initiatives for the most part shared an
additional fact in common. They failed to appreciate and unite with a
central strategic conception of Jackson's, a conception that made the
Rainbow movement that much more relevant. The Rainbow movement, exercising
the legacy of the Non-Partisan Leagues and the Labor Non-Partisan League
from the early-to-mid 20th century, was an effort both within the Democratic
Party but as well existing independently. It is the latter factor that made
the Rainbow so unsettling to the Democratic Party establishment and why they
were so anxious to encourage Jackson's personalist tendencies in undermining
his own movement (this beginning with the successful effort to discourage
Jackson from running as an independent for Senate in South Carolina in
1984). The former factor, however, that is of being also inside the
Democratic Party frightened many people on the Left who have had a quite
justified skepticism if not antipathy to the politics and practice of the
Democratic Party officialdom. It is this central strategic conception that
must be revived and serve as a basis for the next round of progressive
electoral politics.

The realities of the undemocratic U.S. electoral system

The winner-take-all system of US electoral politics has always been an
acknowledged obstacle to genuine democracy. 49% of the voting electorate can
be completely disenfranchised due to the manner of this system's operation.
Added on to this is the entire conception of voter registration and the
complexities of actually voting, not to mention electoral theft (as we
witnessed in November 2000 in Florida, and, indeed, through US electoral
history), and the US system actually discourages voting, accommodating
itself to something that is cynically referenced as a "mature democracy."

The entire system of electoral politics in the USA encourages party-blocs
rather than ideologically-defined or constituency-based political parties.
The Democratic and Republican Parties, therefore, serve more as united front
vehicles pulling together very diverse constituencies. These party-blocs are
far from amorphous, but their manner of construction permits the possibility
of electoral victories and the ability to overcome the demographic,
financial and other barriers to achieving political power for any one
particular group. Such a system, in addition to being undemocratic, is
biased in favor of moneyed interests as well as favoring stability. In this
sense, the famous 19th century aphorism about the US political system
remains true: the two political parties are the equivalent of two wings of
the same evil bird of prey. Yet this aphorism does not replace a concrete
analysis of the realities of US politics and, therefore, does not answer
questions of strategy.

Major sections of the US Left and progressive movements have attempted to
avoid the practical realities of the undemocratic nature of the US electoral
system. Seeing in the party-bloc system the corruption and dumbing-down of
politics, many left-of center activists have simply made the call for
breaking with the two party system and forming something else. While this
may be the correct longer-term goal, such a call does not speak in any way
as to how one gets there. The Labor Party is a case in point.

The late Tony Mazzocchi made an eloquent case for the need for the US
working class to have its own political party. Yet, the construction of this
party did not emphasize a programmatic vision, but rather the willingness of
people to support the IDEA of such a party, i.e., if one believed that there
should be a Labor Party, then one should sign onto the party process. Little
attention was given to the political character of such a party. Secondly,
the party being an IDEA rather than an _expression of a political project,
failed to acknowledge the central importance of the political movements of
people of color. While Mazzocchi himself was a strong and dedicated
anti-racist, the Labor Party effort in basing itself within organized labor,
failed to factor in the larger political movements that have been essential
in shaping and reshaping the USA. Third, Mazzocchi correctly cautioned
against premature electoral interventions lest the Labor Party be forever
consigned to the political margins. At the same time, the Labor Party had an
approach that postponed electoral interventions pending fulfillment of a
criteria (actually a good approach) but never quite factored in how to
address the inevitable electoral losses that would be suffered if/when Labor
Party candidates ran against both Democrats and Republicans (electoral
losses not only to the Labor Party, but losses which would favor the
Republicans period).

At the other end of the spectrum have been symbolic runs for the Presidency.
This includes both Ron Daniels' '92 campaign but as well Ralph Nader's 2000
campaign, not to mention the various minor party campaigns that periodically
surface. Independent candidacies normally have a rationale associated with
them. One common rationale is that they will inspire local activists to run
for local office. Another is that an alternative must be heralded in order
to lay the basis for some future genuine, mass-based progressive politics.
This is actually just another way of saying that all of the existing
candidates are bad and that something new needs to be implanted.

Symbolic independent Presidential campaigns can bring with them great
fanfare, and often get off to an exciting start. Yet, at the end of the day,
they tend to accomplish little unless they are somehow attached to a
political movement. The problem is largely to be found in the pragmatic
reality of our situation. On Election Day, the voters must decide whether
they are content to register a one-time protest or whether they will hold
their nose and vote for someone who MAY happen to change reality in a manner
favorable to the voter. Most US voters choose the more pragmatic course or
they simply sit out the election altogether.

Independent protest candidacies for the US Presidency generally exist
outside of any notion of strategy. Rather than analyzing the actual
conditions under which a progressive political movement can grow in this
country and the necessary building blocks, the independent protest
candidacies simply assert the need for a new set of politics, sort of along
the lines of running an idea up the flag pole to see who salutes.

In many respects the Greens have taken electoral politics most seriously.
While they have backed specific independent presidential initiatives, e.g.,
Ralph Nader in 2000, they have tended to concentrate at the local level
where they have realized some impressive victories. Nevertheless, they too
have run into a specific quandary, i.e., how does one build a political
practice that gets beyond school committee, town council, etc., and
challenges for office in larger cities and counties, not to mention at the
state level? The practice advanced by the Green Party is better suited for
non-partisan elections, ironically enough, but here too, arises the question
of what sort of electoral united front they are capable of building beyond a
certain scale.

Exploring a neo-Rainbow approach to electoral politics

The failure of most post-Rainbow progressive electoral initiatives has
resulted in several tendencies: (1)throwing up one's hands and accepting the
terms of operation within the Democratic Party, (2)throwing up one's hands
and accepting electoral marginalization through symbolic electoral
interventions, (3)throwing up one's hands and abandoning electoral politics
in favor of what appear to be more pure social action movement, or (4)just
throwing up.

In some respects what each of the four tendencies has in common is a degree
of despair as to the possibilities of a progressive political practice in
the electoral arena. Overcoming this despair must be tied directly to
constructing such a practice because in the absence of a credible electoral
movement, it is unlikely that any sustained movement for substantive, not to
mention transformative, politics in the USA will ever see the light of day.
Despite the high degree of abstention in the electoral arena, there is a
deep belief that the system should work, even if it does not. Standing on
the sidelines criticizing the political system without demonstrating the
ability to bring into being an alternative is nothing more than a recipe for
marginalization. The system must, itself, be challenged both as a step
toward fighting for political power as well as a means of actually
demonstrating the fault lines in the system itself.

The problem, then, is one of developing a progressive majoritarian bloc
within the context of US electoral politics. This is a majoritarian bloc, it
should be added, not in some idealistic or utopian sense, but rather a bloc
within the context of the existing political system. Taking up this
strategic challenge means coming face to face with the problem of the
Democratic Party.

As much as many progressives may wish for the replacement of the Democratic
Party by a left/progressive party of struggle, this is unlikely in the
near-term. The establishment of independent political parties in the U.S.
context in the recent past has simply failed to ignite widespread populist
electoral activity. This does not mean, however, that one should expect that
the Democratic Party will itself become the party of the dispossessed in the
U.S. That is unlikely given all the factors familiar to progressives.

Instead activists should look upon the Democratic Party as itself a field of
struggle, and little else. Such a view flows from a realization of the
undemocratic nature of the US electoral system and the dilemmas that
creates. In that context, the fight that needs to take place in the
electoral arena must take place both within and without the Democratic
Party. To carry out such a struggle necessitates organization, vision and
strategy. It also needs the right core in order to anchor it in reality and
build the sort of united front that such an effort or insurgency must
represent. These represent the parameters for the development of a
neo-Rainbow electoral strategy.

Before exploring the potential elements of such a strategy it is worth
making some pre-emptive remarks, so to speak. Experienced activists do not
need to go through a vitriolic exchange on the nastiness of the Democratic
Party or the opportunists that often cling to its label. We know that. As
mentioned earlier, the Democratic Party exists as a party-bloc rather than
as a genuine political party. It is a front of various forces, many of which
are at odds with one another. But it exists and is able to sustain itself
largely because of the nature of the US electoral system which encourages
the tendency toward two party-blocs rather than a proliferation of other
political formations.

Second, it should be obvious, but it is often not, that discussions about a
neo-Rainbow electoral strategy are grounded in a desire to win. Many of us
on the left and progressive side of the aisle are so accustomed to losing
and existing under siege, that the prospect of winning is not only beyond
our belief system, but is often scary. Winning necessitates political
alignments, compromises and often tactics that are far from pure. Winning
certainly carries with it the potentiality of selling out. This is a risk,
however, that any social movement must be prepared to accept if it is in the
least bit serious about its own integrity and objectives, not to mention,
the fight for power.

Third, building a strategy around a particular candidacy carries with it
profound dangers as well. The collapse of the Rainbow movement through
Jackson's personalist decisions and approach were clearly evidence of this.
In the more recent period, Congressman Dennis Kucinich's apparently failed
bid for the Democratic nomination should have been additional evidence.
Kucinich's campaign, particularly in light of his courageous anti-Iraq war
stand, could have been a tremendous vehicle for organization and political
action. It turned out not to be. Kucinich ran into the same problems as most
white populists in shelving race in the name of economic justice.
Additionally, he had the wrong core for both a campaign and a movement.
While Kucinich could have used his campaign—knowing full well that he would
not get the nomination—as sort of a strategy center or springboard for the
building of a left/progressive bloc of political forces for the long-term,
his campaign was no where near as inclusive as it needed to be. Driven, as
it was by the demands of the campaign and the primaries, there was also
little room for the sort of longer-term discussion so badly needed.

Thus, thinking through an alternative electoral strategy really must begin
with a severing of the connection or dependency between that alternative and
a particular personality. While an alternative electoral strategy will need
strong personalities/candidates in order to champion the causes that must be
championed, that is a different reality than building as the foundation of
an alternative strategy a particular personality, with all of the strengths
and weaknesses associated with such.

Key elements to work with

A neo-Rainbow electoral strategy needs to contain the following elements:
(1)building an identifiable, accountable organization that operates inside
and outside the Democratic Party, (2)has at its leading core, people of
color, and a base among African Americans and Latinos (not to the exclusion
of others), (3)has a united front approach to growth, encouraging diverse
constituencies, (4)is pro-equality populist in its politics, heralding the
unity of the struggles for racial, gender and economic justice as the
cornerstones to a larger stand in favor of consistent democracy, (5)supports
a change in US foreign policy toward what can be called a democratic foreign
policy, (6)recognizes that while race is the trip-wire of US politics, class
represents the fault line, therefore, rooting itself among working people
and their issues, (7)develops a ground-up approach, with ward & precinct
organizations, and a targeted effort to build political power in key
strategic zones. The remainder of this article shall briefly summarize these
components.

(1)An accountable organization operating both inside and outside the
Democratic Party: Drawing on the history of the Rainbow candidacies and
organization, as well as other efforts, such as the Non-Partisan Leagues, an
inside/outside approach seems to most correspond to the actual political
constraints of the US electoral system. The failure of the Rainbow movement
lay not with following this strategy—contrary to criticisms often raised by
the ultra-"left"—but by the failure to build a democratic organization that
was both sufficiently rooted as well as independent of one personality. If
there was a mistake in '89 it was that the activists who had truly been the
foundation of the Rainbow movement permitted a situation to exist where Rev.
Jackson could carry out the coup against himself with little significant
opposition. The tendency, even among committed progressive activists, to
defer to Rev. Jackson's decision was disastrous. The fact, by way of
example, that a prominent Black elected official could say, with a straight
face, that Rev. Jackson had the "right" to his own organization, illustrated
the political weaknesses of the movement itself.

To be clear, working inside and outside the Democratic Party means
establishing an organization—which is not an independent political party,
but is an independent organization—that runs candidates within the
Democratic primaries, runs in non-partisan elections, and runs
independently, all based on an assessment of the actual situation rather
than on a cookie-cutter format. Working inside and outside the Democratic
Party does not mean, however, placing a great deal of time and attention on
occupying specific positions within the Democratic Party itself. Such
decisions need to be made in the context of a longer-term political
strategy.

(2)An initiative that has a leading core of people of color: As discussed,
the Rainbow movement had the advantage of having been based, first and
foremost, on the Black-led electoral upsurge of the early 1980s. In other
words, it was rooted in a movement. In addition, the core was people of
color who linked racial justice with broader social and economic justice
issues. As such, this effort represented the continuity of the demand for
consistent democracy within the USA. It avoided many of the problems of
white populism, which seeks to an end-run around the question of racial
justice. While white populism can and often does attract adherents of color,
it does not achieve a political base among communities of color, at least in
the current era.

It is not sufficient, however, to have a core that is majority of color.
Those in the room in the very founding of such an effort must bring
credentials to the table, i.e., they must be leaders in their own right,
irrespective of their titles and positions. Thus, they must represent a
constituency. A neo-Rainbow effort, in other words, cannot be defined alone
as the gathering of a group of activists, the majority of who are of color,
but must represent an initiative deeply rooted and carry with it popular
credibility.

A final point: the changing demographics of the USA, along with a different
strategic situation, necessitates that a neo-Rainbow approach does not seek
to replicate the "Black and…" approach of the past. The necessity for a
partnership and the recognition of a key alliance, particularly between
African Americans and Latinos, must be at the core of renewed progressive
politics in the USA.

(3)A united front approach: The willingness and ability of Rev. Jackson to
reach out to diverse constituencies marked one of the most significant
aspects of the Rainbow movement. I remember in 1988 visiting striking paper
workers in Jay, Maine. I represented Boston-area Rainbow labor activists in
this visit. Rev. Jackson had spoken before these strikers one week earlier.
The receptivity to my message and the closeness that they felt to Rev.
Jackson was not accidental. They saw themselves in the Rainbow, and they
heard their own voices in Rev. Jackson's rhetoric.

Largely through the activities of the Left, additional constituencies were
tapped, constituencies with which Rev. Jackson had little history. Asians
and Latinos, particularly, became well-organized segments of the campaigns
and movement.

An intriguing aspect of the '80s Rainbow movement was its ability to gather
together various political tendencies, including the Left, the Black Church
and segments of the Black political establishment, as note earlier. The
growing class divides in the USA, and the emergence of more conservative
political tendencies within the political establishments of people of color,
may make such an effort more complicated today. Many of the assumptions from
the Civil Rights and immediate post-Civil Rights era can simply not be made.
This has again become evident in Black politics when, in the aftermath of
the US-inspired coup against Haiti's President Aristide of February 2004,
the Congressional Black Caucus as a whole was divided on how to respond.

That said, the project of neo-Rainbow politics cannot afford to be a project
exclusively of the Left, but must represent a coalition of left/progressive
forces, otherwise it will face certain doom.

(4)The need for pro-equality populist politics: This theme has run
throughout this article, so little needs to be reiterated. An
anti-corporate, anti-finance speculation approach to politics is essential
if progressive politics are to re-emerge. This can be seen in the works and
views of diverse political actors, including Jim Hightower, Michael Moore
and Barbara Ehrenreich. Yet, US history repeatedly demonstrates that this is
insufficient in order to sustain a progressive alternative. Building the
linkage between the fights for economic, political and social justice and
specifically between the fights for racial, gender and economic justice will
lead to a movement resonating particularly within communities of color
rather than limiting ourselves to social criticism.

When one considers once more the Kucinich campaign in 2004, one sees a
missed opportunity. As good as were his stands, Kucinich did not represent a
breakthrough on the race divide. His message was about those things that we
have in common but did not speak to the Grand Canyon of the US reality. As
such, he did not position himself to be a candidate of people of color,
essentially deferring that role to Al Sharpton and Carol Mosley-Braun, to
different degrees. The latter two, particularly Sharpton, became the 'race'
candidates, and Kucinich became the anti-war and economic justice candidate.
Neo-Rainbow politics must establish a means of linking these. A similar
criticism can be made of Ralph Nader in 2000 and again today, who seems to
avoid race and racial justice issues like the plague.

Pro-equality populist politics is fundamentally about inclusion, and in that
sense is not about watering down unity. Rev. Jackson began this in the '80s,
for example, in his open, public embrace of gays and lesbians at a point
when many, if not most, traditional political leaders kept this sector at
arms' length. 21st century pro-equality populism must be just as courageous
and as inclusive.

(5)A democratic foreign policy: One of the strengths of Jackson as an
individual, and his Rainbow candidacies, was his willingness to stake out
new ground on foreign policy. Again, breaking from the notion that the
Rainbow movement was simply a Black protest movement, the Rainbow movement
spoke out on international issues, albeit inconsistently.

In light of the current international situation and the aggressive, maniacal
US foreign policy matched by the generally spinelessness of the official
Democratic Party, a neo-Rainbow movement would need to articulate an
alternative vision of international affairs and foreign policy. This
democratic foreign policy, so to speak, would need to be built on
multilateralism, mutual respect among nations, against US interventionism,
the search for non-military methods of problem solving, and the support of
self-determination of nations. While this is not a Left program, it would
represent a significant reform in the realm of US foreign policy.

(6)Class and the roots of the neo-Rainbow project: The Labor Party attempted
to carve out the turf of class as its sphere. In so doing, it handled the
question of race ambiguously. A neo-Rainbow project and politics needs to
look at working people as more than simply another constituency—which is the
standard approach in established electoral politics—but rather look at
working people as the fundamental base of the neo-Rainbow politics. This
means that the language of the movement as well as the literal base-areas,
must be working people-centered.

The additional aspect of this is that the neo-Rainbow project itself should
have as central to its existence the redistribution of wealth and power in
the USA and the restriction on the right of Capital to run rough-shod over
the people of this country and, for that matter, the world.

(7)Building with a ground-up approach: The neo-Rainbow project cannot be
limited to being a formal coalition that comes together around a specific
candidate or set of candidates. First, it must be a national project,
although there will need to be targeted, geographic areas in which the
project will first seek to take root. As a national project, it must seek to
articulate a compelling social vision that helps to break the isolation of
left/progressive activists and movements, focusing them on the strategies
towards and possibilities of achieving political power. At the same time,
this project must be rooted in communities, through ward and precinct
organization, that begins with a process of consolidation of committed
activist/leaders (leaders with a small "l") around the mission and vision of
the project. To that extent, the project must begin not with the notion of
launching a candidacy for President of the USA, or for that matter, a
candidate for any other office. Rather, the project must come together with
a notion of fighting for power and to change the relations of power in the
USA.

Building the neo-Rainbow project, then, would be connected with analyzing
the power structures in various communities, understanding the real issues
of the people, linking with community-based and workplace-based
organizations, identifying potential candidates for office and the issues
around which they should organize their campaigns, and, ultimately, running
for office.



Taking the first steps are often the hardest

There is a scene in the recent action/adventure film Kill Bill, Vol. 1,
where the injured Uma Thurman, is lying in a car looking at her feet, which
are essentially paralyzed. She concentrates and then utters something to the
effect of, "…ok toe; start moving…"

In some sense that is the stage that progressives find ourselves in this
election year of 2004. We can limit ourselves to commentary on the relative
merits of Kerry vs. Nader; we can turn away from electoral politics in
complete scorn at the choices, or we can get our toes moving as the first
efforts toward a new mass politics.

In the Rainbow movement of the 1980s we saw elements of what the new
politics could be. It led some to believe that a political realignment could
be brought into existence by the beginning of the 21st century. For a host
of reasons, including but not limited to the personality and politics of the
Rainbow's leader, this did not come to pass. Yet we can draw upon that
movement for far more than inspiration. We can see in that movement the
outlines of a direction that our journey must take us. In that sense, while
the direction may look somewhat familiar, it will truly be a direction
toward the fabled undiscovered country—a journey into the future.

-----------------------------------------

Danny Glover is a long-time human rights activist and internationally
recognized actor. He has been a spokesperson for many causes including
anemia, HIV/AIDS, Haitian sovereignty and global justice. He is the
chairperson of the Board of Directors of TransAfrica Forum, a Washington,
DC-based non-profit organizing and educational center formed to raise
awareness in the USA regarding issues facing the nations and peoples of
Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America.

Bill Fletcher, Jr. is the president of TransAfrica Forum. He is a long-time
labor activist and was deeply involved in the 1984 and 1988 Jackson
campaigns.

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors do not represent the
views of TransAfrica Forum (which cannot take positions on partisan
political matters).

#30#



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[1] A progressive, mass-based organization formed under the leadership of
Rev. Jesse Jackson, with the stated purpose of developing an independent
presence in the electoral arena.

[2] "Almost," in the sense that Jackson was not an unknown. He was a
political leader who had been involved in the Civil Rights movement and the
formation of his own organization, Operation PUSH (People United to Save
Humanity). His rise appeared to many as out of no where because he had been
the subject of much criticism.